

## 資料

### ケインズ (1936)

1. ‘The classical economists’ was a name invented by Marx to cover Ricardo and James Mill and their *predecessors*, that is to say for the founders of the theory which culminated in the Ricardian economics. I have become accustomed, perhaps perpetrating a solecism, to include in ‘the classical school’ the *followers* of Ricardo, those, that is to say, who adopted and perfected the theory of the Ricardian economics, including (for example) J. S. Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Prof. Pigou. p. 3, footnote 1.

2. Political Economy you think is an enquiry into the nature and causes of wealth — I think it should rather be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation. No law can be laid down respecting quantity, but a tolerably correct one can be laid down respecting proportions. Every day I am more satisfied that the former enquiry is vain and delusive, and the latter only the true objects of the science.

Ricardo’s letter to Malthus, 9 October 1820, *GT*, p. 4, footnote 1.  
(*The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo*. Vol. VIII, pp. 278–279.)

3. From the time of Say and Ricardo the classical economists have taught that supply creates its own demand; — meaning by this in some significant, but not clearly defined, sense that the whole of the costs of production must necessarily be spent in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, on purchasing the product.

p. 18.

### マルクス (1883)

1. Um es ein für allemal zu bemerken, verstehe ich unter klassischer politischer Oekonomie alle Oekonomie seit W. Petty, die den innern Zusammenhang der bürgerlichen Produktionsverhältnisse erforscht im Gegensatz zur Vulgärökonomie, die sich nur innerhalb des scheinbaren Zusammenhangs herumtreibt, für eine plausible Verständlichmachung der sozusagen größten Phänomene und den bürgerlichen Hausbedarf das von der wissenschaftlichen Oekonomie längst gelieferte Material stets von neuem wiederkaut, im übrigen aber sich darauf beschränkt, die banalen und selbstgefälligen Vorstellungen der bürgerlichen Produktionsagenten von ihrer eignen besten Welt zu systematisieren, pedantisieren und als ewige Wahrheiten zu proklamieren. p. 87, footnote 32.

2. Seit 1848 has sich die kapitalistische Production rasch in Deutschland entwickelt und treibt heutzutage bereits ihre Schwindelblüthe. Aber unsren Fachleuten blieb das Geschick gleich abhold. Solange sie politische Oekonomie unbefangen treiben konnten, fehlten die modernen ökonomischen Verhältnisse in der deutschen Wirklichkeit. Sobald diese Verhältnisse ins Leben traten, geschah es unter Umständen, welche ihr unbefangenes Studium innerhalb des

bürgerlichen Gesichtskreises nicht länger zulassen. So weit sie bürgerlich ist, d.h. die kapitalistische Ordnung statt als geschichtlich vorübergehende Entwicklungsstufe, umgekehrt als absolute und letzte Gestalt der gesellschaftlichen Produktion auffaßt, kann die politische Oekonomie nur Wissenschaft bleiben, so lange der Klassenkampf latent bleibt oder sich in nur vereinzelt Erscheinungen offenbart.

Nehmen wir England. Seine klassische politische Oekonomie fällt in die Periode des unentwickelten Klassenkampfes. Ihr letzter großer Repräsentant, Ricardo, macht endlich bewußt den Gegensatz der Klasseninteressen, des Arbeitslohns und des Profits, des Profits und der Grundrente, zum Springpunkt seiner Forschungen, indem er diesen Gegensatz naiv als gesellschaftliches Naturgesetz auffaßt. Damit aber auch die bürgerliche Wissenschaft der Oekonomie bei ihrer unüberschreitbaren Schranke angelangt. Noch bei Lebzeiten Ricardos und im Gegensatz zu ihm trat ihr in der Person Sismondis die Kritik gegenüber.

Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage, pp. 11–12.

3. Eine ganze Reihe bürgerlicher Oekonomen, wie James Mill, MacCulloch, Torrens, Senior, J. St. Mill, usw. . . .

Part IV, Chapter XIII, Section 6, p.460.

4. Zur Vermeidung von Mißverständnissen bemerke ich, daß wenn Männer wie J. St. Mill usw. wegen des Widerspruchs ihrer altökonomischen Dogmen und ihrer modernen Tendenzen zu rügen sind, es durchaus unrecht wäre, sie mit dem Troß der vulgärökonomischen Apologanten zusammenzuwerfen.

Part VII, Chapter XXII, Section 5, p. 642, footnote 65.

## ヴェブレン (1900)

1. Seen through modern eyes and without effort to turn past gains to modern account, the metaphysical or preconceptional furniture of political economy as it stood about the middle of this century may come to look quite curious. The two main canons of truth on which the science proceeded, and with which the inquiry is here concerned, were: (a) a hedonistic-associational psychology, and (b) an uncritical conviction that there is a meliorative trend in the course of events, apart from the conscious ends of the individual members of the community. This axiom of a meliorative developmental trend fell into shape as a belief in an organic or quasi-organic (psychological) life process on the part of the economic community or of the nation; and this belief carried with it something of a constraining sense of self-realizing cycles of growth, maturity and decay in the life history of nations or communities. p. 242.

2. This position, here outlined with as little qualifications as may be admissible, embodies the general metaphysical ground of that classical political economy that affords the point of departure for Mill and Cairnes, and also for Jevons. And what is to be said of Mill and Cairnes in this connection will apply to the later course of the science, though with a gradually lessening force.

p. 243.

3. It may be remarked . . . that the use of the differential calculus and similar mathematical expedients in the discussion of marginal utility and the like, proceeds on this psychological ground, and that the theoretical results so arrived at are valid to the full extent only if this hedonistic psychology is accepted.

p. 248, footnote.

4. In consonance with this quasi-evolutionary tone of the neo-classical political economy, or as an expression of it, comes the further clarified sense that nowadays attaches to the terms “normal” and economic “laws.” The laws have gained in colorlessness, until it can no longer be said that the concept of normality implies approval of the phenomena to which it is applied. They are in an increasing degree laws of conduct, though they still continue to formulate conduct in hedonistic terms; that is to say, conduct is construed in terms of its sensuous effect, not in terms of its teleological content.

pp. 267–268.

5. The discipline of life in a modern community, particularly the industrial life, strongly re-enforced by the modern sciences, has divested our knowledge of non-human phenomena of that fulness of self-directing life that was once imputed to them, and has reduced this knowledge to terms of opaque causal sequence. It has thereby narrowed the range of discretionary, teleological action to the human agent alone; and so it is compelling our knowledge of human conduct, in so far as it is distinguished from the non-human, to fall into teleological terms.

pp. 268–269.

### ドップ (1924)

1. The economic aspect of Individualism as recast in modern garb is consummately represented in the social philosophy of the Cambridge School of economists, or (as a writer in *The New Republic* recently termed it) of the Cambridge “Neo-Classicists.” The term Neo-Classicist is not entirely inappropriate; for what the Cambridge School has done is to divest Classical Political Economy of its more obvious crudities, to sever its connection with the philosophy of natural law, and to restate it in terms of the differential calculus. The line of descent is fairly direct from Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo; and Cambridge has remained relatively untouched by the anti-classical doctrines of the German semi-Socialists and the Austrian School.

This economic theory regards the *telos* of all economic activity as the maximization of utilities. This is the economic maxim. Cost represents a deprivation of certain utilities. The economic justification for incurring any cost is that not only a greater utility is obtained but the greatest possible utility under the circumstances. Hence, two conditions are necessary to the fulfilment of the economic maxim. First, marginal utility must be greater than marginal cost. Second, economic resources must be so distributed between various uses, that there could be no gain from shifting resources from one use to the other. These conditions imply the existence of an *economic measure* as the regulator of production; and this is afforded by the mechanism of price.

pp. 68–69.

**2.** To the individualist the Industrial Revolution is important, because it introduced the free economic order. The pre-existing “errors” of the Mercantilists were abandoned and the great “truths” of Adam Smith won the day. p. 66.